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ARGUMENT

L

The Water that Miss Jex Slipped on Does Not Have to be Considered a
Temporary Condition.
While Appellees argue that the puddle Miss Jex slipped on can only be considered

a temporary condition, they point to no case in which a court has held that the two types
of conditions (temporary and permanent) are mutually exclusive. In as much as Miss Jex
slipped as a result of the defendant's failure to employ adequate safety measures in their
daily activities, the injury was the result of a permanent condition or mode of operation
created by the defendants. This is illustrated by DeWesse v. J.C. Penny where the plaintiff
slipped on water (a condition defendant's argue is temporary), yet the court found the
condition to be permanent because it involved an unsafe mode of operation—the failure
of J.C. Penny to put out non skid mats in light of snowy weather conditions. See 297 P.2d
898, 901 (Utah 1956). While Miss Jex slipped on water, the presence of the water was
attributable to Appellees' unsafe mode of operation and thus, can be a permanent
condition. The unsafe method of operation is outlined in expert Charles Haines affidavit
and includes a
II.

There is Extensive Evidence, Which Appellees Failed to Acknowledge,
Showing that Constructive Knowledge Should be Imputed.
Appellees argue that the present case is more like Lindsay than Ohlson and Silcox.

However, this argument is not well founded. First, m Lindsay, there was absolutely no
2

circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff showing how long the water had
existed before she slipped on it. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 477,478 (Utah
1955). In the present case there are numerous pieces of evidence showing that the water
on Defendant's floor existed for long enough that defendant should have discovered it.
First, the shoes of Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would
have easily become lodged in the deep grooves of their shoes and would have been
tracked onto the wood floor when they entered the store. Second, Mr. Fillmore had been
outside shoveling the snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling
would have required Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times
whereas Miss Jex walked into the store after snow removal had occurred (R. at 290).
Third, the amount of time needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in
the one second it took Miss Jex to stepfromthe mat onto the wood floor. Fourth, with the
small tread on Miss Jex's shoes, any traces of water and snow would almost certainly
been removed from her shoes by the time she reached the wood floor because she walked
on approximately twenty five feet of mats before she arrived at the counter (See R. at
289). On the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene walked
through the front of the store (See R. at 290). When taken in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the facts show that either Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore tracked in the snow that
caused the water on the floor. Thus, the water was very likely on the floor for 1-2 hours
before Miss Jex slipped on it. These pieces of evidence are no different than the evidence
relied on in Ohlson where the court determined that the condition had existed for a long

enough time that Appellees should have discovered it. See Ohlson v. Safeway Stores,
Inc.. 568 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1977).
Ill*

Appellees, Like the Defendant's in De Weese, Created a Hazardous Condition
by Choosing to Employ a Wood Floor in their Store.
Appellees argue that the present case is distinguishable from De Weese, but fail to

articulate just how the two cases are different. Just as the defendants in De Weese,
Appellees in the present case failed to employ the corrective safety measure they usually
used. Mr. Fillmore admitted that he had previously placed mats in the area where Miss
Jex fell. However, on the occasion in question there were no mats to guard against the
slippery nature of the wood flooring (See R. at 288). Because Appellees chose to use
wood flooring in their store (an inherently dangerous condition) and because it was
foreseeable that water would be tracked onto the floor on a snowy day, Appellees are
liable to Miss Jex under the permanent condition theory of storeowner liability.
Appellees also argue that this case is like Schnuphase where the plaintiff made
allegations of poor safety precautions, but failed to show that there was an inherently
dangerous condition. This analysis is not well placed. Miss Jex is not arguing that the
failure of Appellees to take certain precautionary measures (as outlined in the affidavit of
expert witness Charles Haines) was an inherently dangerous condition. Rather, Miss Jex
is arguing that the Appellees' woodfloor was an inherently dangerous condition and that
by failing to take certain precautionary measures appellees failed to adequately guard
against the inherently dangerous condition they chose to employ, just as the defendant in
Canfield did not adequately guard against the inherently dangerous method of displaying
4

lettuce that that it chose to employ. See Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227
(Utah Ct App.l cert, denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
IV.

All Other Arguments Made by Appellees are Addressed in Appellant's Brief.
This reply brief does not address every argument made by Appellees because most

of Appellee's arguments are addressed in Appellant's brief. For the sake of brevity, this
reply brief addresses only those arguments raised by Appellees that were not adequately
addressed in the Appellant Brief.
CONCLUSION

Due to the trial court's errors in applying Utah law and awarding summary
judgment to the defendants when there were issues of material fact, this Court should
remand the case to the trial court. Miss Jex has provided sufficient evidence of
constructive knowledge, inherent danger, and foreseeability to overcome a summary
judgment ruling.
DATED this

fo

day of January, 2007

Denton M. Hatch
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